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Development economists (Todaro and Smith, 2011) have long ad-
vanced the idea that international tourism and domestic recreational
spending have the potential to foster employment and expand economic ac-
tivity. Several reviews (Li et al., 2018; Pablo-Romero and Molina, 2013) of
the empirical literature on the link between expenditures on tourism and
recreation, and economic growth, report the association is generally posi-
tive. Moreover, researchers have found a significant correlation between
tourism and economic expansion in a range of developing nations
(Manzoor et al., 2019), including Pakistan (Adnan Hye and Khan, 2013
and Manzoor et al., 2019). In Pakistan, recreation and tourism accounted
for 6.5% of total employment and 7.4% of total Gross Domestic Product
in 2017 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2018).1
Nobel Laureate Ester Duflo (2012) makes a compelling case that when
women become empowered – have a voice in making important decisions
about their life, such as whether to work outside of the home for pay andmithA@wlu.edu (A.H. Goldsmith),
n, an increase in tourism – signifi-
nd development.
Ltd. This is an open access article uhave the authority tomake decisions over household expenditures – the ag-
gregate economy expands.2 A myriad of empirical papers (Chaudhry and
Nosheen, 2009, Rahman and Rao, 2004) have documented a positive asso-
ciation between women's earning and their authority over spending in tra-
ditional homemaker areas such as food, and clothing in poor nations. In
Pakistan, given the continuous rise in the ratio of both – female, relative
to male, labor force participation and employment – since 19903 it is possi-
ble that women have acquired some degree of empowerment over family
expenditures on recreation and travel (R&T). This could lead to the expan-
sion of the tourism sector and greater development if women are more in-
clined to spend on R&T than men. This may occur if, in their role as a
primary caregiver for children, they believe that travel for leisure and cul-
tural enrichment is important for their children. Interestingly, Zahoor ul
Haq et al. (2019) report that whenwomen in Pakistan are solely responsible
for making household decisions about R&T a household is more likely to
participate in tourism and recreation.2 The United Nations MillenniumDeclaration, signed in September 2000, committed world
leaders to combat extreme poverty through the realization of eight targets known as the Mil-
lennium Development Goals. Goal number three calls for the promotion of gender equality
and the empowerment of women. Although a substantive voice in family spending on recrea-
tion and travel would empower women in the family and promote gender equity in the house-
hold setting it is unclear if this form of agency would foster a reduction in extreme poverty.
3 Women were 17% as likely to participate in the labor force as men in 1990 and 27% as
likely in 2019, while they were 14% as likely as men to work in 1991 and 21% as likely in
1991 – based on data from the World Bank's International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT da-
tabase for 2020.
nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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powerment over R&T spending, to date, in Pakistan – or elsewhere –
since we are unaware of any academic studies on this topic. The aim of
this paper is to provide information on how often women direct family ex-
penditures over R&T, the extent of their empowerment, and the factors that
promote it.
Using data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement
Survey (PSLM): 2005-2006 we ask three questions. First, what is the prev-
alence, and strength of women's empowerment over household spending
onR&T formarriedwomen in Pakistan? Second, doesworking for pay, hav-
ing more children, family structure – type of family and composition – and
personal characteristics influence women's empowerment as predicted by
bargaining and feminist theory?
Third, is there evidence of bias, that mars the accuracy of hypothesis
tests regarding the determinants of women's empowerment over household
R&T spending, if likely reverse causality associated with the influence of
women's empowerment on employment and having additional children is
ignored?
We report evidence that married women are more empowered to make
decisions over R&T spending when they work for pay, have children, and
are educated, while they have less agency in this sphere when they live in
an extended family – especially if it is a large group and their mother in
law resides with them.
Thefindingswe report will be valuable to tourism operators in Pakistan,
since there is evidence they are interested in learning the preferences of
their clients, including women, to design and offer attractive tourism pack-
ages (Haq et al., 2008). By knowing what leads to situations where women
have the capacity to make expenditure decisions over R&T – and tracking
alterations in these factors – theywill be better positioned to plan for the fu-
ture by adjusting their offerings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the lit-
erature review. Data are discussed in Section 3 and methodology is de-
scribed in Section 4. The findings are reported and discussed in Section 5.
In Section 6 we present the major conclusions and implications.
2. Literature review and theoretical framework
2.1. Tourism in Pakistan
Pakistan has an extensive assortment of cultural, religious, and spiritual
attractions along with fabulous scenery leading to many World Heritage
Sites designated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2018). As a result, recre-
ation and tourism is one of the largest industries in Pakistan. Pakistan had
50 million domestic tourists – residents traveling within the nation's bor-
ders, typically on short trips – in 2018. Moreover, 1.9 million foreign tour-
ists visited Pakistan in 2018. Recreation and tourism accounted for 6.5% of
total employment and 7.4% of total Gross Domestic Product of Pakistan in
2017 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2018) in spite of security con-
cerns, inadequate roads, and poor accommodations by international stan-
dards leading to a low Travel and Tourism Competitiveness ranking
(Arshad et al., 2018).
Tourism operators in Pakistan (Haq et al., 2008) recognize that women
are motivated to travel for R&T for a variety of reasons including; personal
pleasure – which includes opportunities to shop – status within the house-
hold, family leisure, cultural enrichment, religious obligations,4 and
children's development.5 Almani et al. (2012) assert that women in
Pakistan are primarily responsible for managing the household and the4 The Holy Quran encourages Muslims to travel to learn about their historical, social, and
cultural roots and to gain knowledge (Timothy and Olsen, 2006), which helps explains why
recreational and tourism travel is such a large sector of the economy in Pakistan where 97%
of the families are Muslims.
5 Ali andHaq (2006) present evidence, using data from the Pakistan Socio-Economic Survey
(PSES) Round-2, that when Pakistani women have authority over household spending they re-
port experiencing a greater level of happiness. This is consistent with the idea (Duflo, 2012)
that empowerment lifts the status of women in their families and communities.
2
nurturing of children given the prevailing norms. Arshad (2008) reports
that these activities occupy the typical mother in Pakistan from morning
to evening virtually every day, and the Pakistan Time Use Survey reveals
that 55% of women do not leave their homes during a typical day (Adeel
et al., 2013). Thus, married women in Pakistan may actively seek agency
over family spending on R&T as a means of ensuring that vacation time is
structured to both provide themwith an opportunity to relax, and activities
to enrich her children.2.2. Theory
The convention in the literature on the agency of married women is to
use a husband-wife bargaining framework to generate insights about the
sources of a women's leverage – often referred to as threat utilities
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; McElroy and Horney, 1981) – and hence
decision-making capacity. A fundamental notion of this paradigm is that
husbands value their leisure time and their relative status – power – in
the household, which comes from generating a greater share of household
income. The idea is that a lack of financial independence makes their wives
insecure and dependent – placing them in a weak position to bargain or ad-
vocate for the capacity to gain decision-making authority. Indeed, a central
finding that emerges from the theoretical work in bargaining theory by
Anderson and Eswaran (2009) is that earned income generated by
women is an effective threat feature in negotiation with their husbands.
Consequently, when women work for pay or are better positioned to do
so by being more educated and more mature – which is assumed to come
with age – they have more leverage in negotiating with their husbands.
Consequently,
Hypothesis 1. (H1) asserts that when women work for pay they have more le-
verage in negotiating with their husbands leading to greater empowerment over
household spending on R&T.
The terms empowerment, agency, and autonomy are often used inter-
changeably by scholars interested in the well-being of women (Mishra
and Tripathi, 2011). Kabeer (1999) emphasizes that to operationalizing
empowerment it makes sense to separate control over “strategic life
choices” (i.e., employment, having children, and freedom to move about
–which she refers to asfirst-order agency) from authority tomake decisions
over matters such as household spending (denoted as – second-order
agency).
Khan (2014), in an extension of conventional intra-household
bargaining theory, predicts that the more children a couple has – who are
typically raised by the mother – the more favorable her position in deter-
mining the allotment of control over family actions. The underlying reason-
ing is; if a woman with more children departs, her husband must use more
of his time to raise the children, which cuts into his leisure, or he must hire
someone to care for his children which is costly – both of which are devel-
opments hewould prefer to avoid. Thus, the wife gains authority over deci-
sion making to elude a situation where she believes she is better off ceasing
to provide unpaid labor within the household. Thus,
Hypothesis 2a. (H2a) states that additional children empowers married
women with greater capacity to make decisions for the household over R&T
expenditures.
Moreover,
The contribution of each additional child to female empowerment is expected
to exhibit diminishing returns – yield smaller gains in empowerment for fur-
ther children. We refer to this as Hypothesis 2b (H2b).
It is also possible that the gender of her children matters because of a
cultural preference for boys in patriarchal societies such as Pakistan – in
part because they are more likely to be counted on for financial support
in old-age. Indeed, a common theme in the development literature is that
S.U. Khan et al. Annals of Tourism Research Empirical Insights 2 (2021) 100009sons promote a mother's decision-making authority over household spend-
ing (Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001; Morgan et al., 2002). Hence,
Women who bear boys are expected to garner greater empowerment over
household spending on R&T than women who do not have children and
women who have only girls – we denote this hypothesis as Hypothesis 2c
(H2c).
To explore if the gender composition of a woman's children influence
her degree of expenditure empowerment over recreation and travel, we
included five separate indicator variables in the binary and gradational
models we estimated to account for alternative types of families based
on the gender composition of their children – using families with no bi-
ological children of the mother living in the household as the reference
group.
Feminist theory (Folbre, 1994; Kabeer, 1999; Whitehead, 1979) asserts
that a woman's position in the household is governed by gender-linked
structural constraints emanating from rules, norms, and practices embed-
ded in the family. Drawing on this perspective several scholars (Agarwal,
1997; Debnath, 2015; Khan, 2014) have extended household bargaining
theory to account for such cultural features. Once these notions from femi-
nist economics are embedded in the bargaining framework, a third set of
hypotheses about the determinants of married women's empowerment
emerges – that family structure impacts the relative positions of husbands
and wives in bargaining over decision making in the household, and
hence the empowerment of married women over the families R&T
spending.
There are many ways family structure can affect a married women's
level of empowerment over the households' spending on R&T leading to a
host of sub-hypotheses. For instance, the vast majority of Muslim families
in Pakistan are extended, which means they include; a married couple,
their offspring, the husband's parents – with his father being the family pa-
triarch – and often other kin of the family patriarch and their children, all
living under one roof. These multigenerational families typically have per-
sons who can substitute for the husband's wife in raising the children and
providing meals. Thus, Debnath (2015) and Khan (2014) demonstrate
that living in an extended family is expected to undermine the wife's lever-
age in making a deal with her husband regarding authority over spending
decisions. This leads to.
Hypothesis 3a. (H3a), that married women living in an extended family will
garner less empowerment over household spending on R&T.
Moreover, living with more adult relatives of her husband offers him
more ways to replace the fundamental services she provides to the family,
which reduces her power when bargaining for spending authority over
R&T. Thus,
Hypothesis 3b. (H3b) asserts that married women will be less empowered to
make decisions regarding household spending on R&T if they live in larger ex-
tended families due to the presence of more adults.
The composition of a wife's extended family is also assumed to impact
her level of empowerment. A wife's mother-in-law is the family matriarch
if she resides in the household. In that role she can make demands on her
daughter in law – including high standards for child-rearing and housework
that would harmher prospects for working for pay – shifting leverage to her
husband. Consequently,
Hypothesis 3c. (H3c) posits that living with her mother-in-law curtails a mar-
ried women's level of empowerment over R&T expenditures.
Certain personal characteristics are also expected to impact husband-
wife bargaining leverage. For instance, married women who are more edu-
cated are expected to be in a stronger position when bargaining with their
husband over R&T expenditure authority. Therefore,3
Hypothesis 4. Asserts that greater education leads to a larger level of R&T ex-
penditure empowerment for married women.
Theory also posits that residential location and family status can influ-
ence a married women's bargaining stature. For instance, residing in a
more conservative province or a rural community, areas characterized by
more traditional values, will diminish her bargaining position and hence
empowerment over the families R&T spending. We control for these factors
as well as the age of the wife and demographic characteristics of her hus-
band in our empirical work, but do not focus on these enough to warrant
setting out specific hypotheses.2.3. Women's empowerment in Pakistan
Researchers have documented the level of women's empowerment in
Pakistan by reporting their level of; mobility (Hussain and Jullandhry,
2020 and Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001), labor force participation (Azid
et al., 2001; Kozel and Alderman, 1990), wages (Ashraf and Ashraf,
1993), and authority over household's purchase of food and clothing
(Hussain and Jullandhry, 2020 and Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001). Most of
these studies offer evidence of an association between the level of female
empowerment under investigation and socioeconomic and demographic
factors. However, an interesting question, yet to be investigated for
Pakistan and other countries, is what are the determinants of women's em-
powerment over R&T spending? Moreover, they fail to account for the pos-
sibility of endogeneity bias, which would likely result in inaccurate
estimates of the linkage between these variables.3. Data
3.1. Data sources
To estimate the determinants of empowerment amongst married
women over household spending on R&T – and the extent of their
decision-making authority in this realm –we use data from the Pakistan So-
cial and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM): 2005-2006 con-
ducted by the Federal Bureau of Statistics. For each household taking part
in the PSLM, two separate surveys are conducted. One survey is completed
by the male and the second survey is completed by the wife. There were
15,453 randomly selected households chosen to participate in the PSLM:
2005-2006. In these households, there were 25,651 women age 15-49.
We restrict our analysis to married women in this age bracket, resulting
in an analysis sample containing 12,517 married women.
The PSLM: 2005-2006 is well suited for examining the determinants,
and prevalence, of female empowerment over household spending on
R&T for at least three reasons. First, it provides direct information on a
wife's level of decision-making authority over expenditures on recreation
and travel by her family – the outcome of interest (i.e., dependent variable).
Second, the PSLM contains information on the employment status of mar-
ried female respondents as well as the number of her children living in
the household –which allows us to evaluate hypotheses 1 and 2. A third de-
sirable feature of these data is that the survey provides rich demographic
and family information, along with information on the characteristics of
the husband and wife –information needed to assess Hypotheses 3 and 4.
It is important to emphasize that we are able to conduct this study be-
cause married women respondents in the PSLM reported their level of au-
thority when selecting and purchasing R&T goods and services, not only
for themselves but also for children and other family members. For this
type of spending, she identified, from a list of 7 options, who in the family
had the authority to make the expenditure decisions. The options included;
1 = woman herself, 2 = head/father of the household decides alone, 3 =
head/father in consultation with his/her spouse, 4 = head/father in con-
sultation with the woman concerned, 5 = head/father and spouse of the
head in consultation with the woman concerned, 6 = head/father and
other male members decide, 7 = other combinations of persons decide.
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of R&T spending agency that could take on a value of 0, 1, or 2 which cor-
responds to No Empowerment, Partial Empowerment, and Strong Empower-
ment. A woman was classified as having No Empowerment if she indicated
having no voice (response category 2 or 6) in making spending decisions
in this realm. If a woman reported that she was the sole decision-maker
over R&T spending (response category 1) she is categorized as possessing
Strong Empowerment. Partial Empowerment characterizes a situation where
thewoman reports that she plays a role, alongwith some grouping of others
in the family, in making R&T spending decisions (i.e., she selects response
category; 3, 4, 5, or 7).
The convention in the literature on women's empowerment over family
expenditures on food and clothing is to gauge female spending agency
using a bivariate indicator which reveals if a woman has At Least Some Em-
powerment relative to No Empowerment. Therefore, we also construct, and
utilize in our empirical work, a bivariate indicator for a mother's empower-
ment over R&T spending. An advantage of the gradational measure of
women's empowerment over R&T spending is that it provides a finer depic-
tion of her level of R&T decision-making capacity.Table 1
Variable definitions.
Variable name Definition
Strong 1 if married woman is sole decision-maker over R&T
spending, 0 otherwise




1 if married woman has Strong or Partial Empowerment, 0
otherwise
Employed 1 if married woman works outside of the home for pay, 0
otherwise
Number of (her) Children Number of married women's biological offspring living
with her
Extended Family 1 if married women lives in an extended family, 0
otherwise
# Adult Extended Family
Members
Total number of adults non-nuclear family members living
in the household
Mother in Law Present 1 if the wife's mother in law living with the wife and her
family, 0 otherwise
Only Boys 1 if all the married women's children living with her are
boys, 0 otherwise
Only Girls 1 if all the married women's children living with her are
girls, 0 otherwise
Boys > Girls 1 if of her children in the household Boys > Girls, 0
otherwise
Girls > Boys 1 if of her children in the household Girls > Boys, 0
otherwise
Girls = Boys 1 if of her children in the household Boys = Girls, 0
otherwise
W-Age Age of the married woman in years
W-Some Education 1 if married woman attended & completed ≤ 8 years of
school, 0 otherwise
W-Well Educated 1 if married woman attended & completed > 8 years of
school, 0 otherwise
H-Age Age of the married woman's husband
H-Some Education 1 if her husband attended & completed ≤ 8 years of
school, 0 otherwise
H-Well educated 1 if her husband attended & completed > 8 years of school,
0 otherwise
SES–Medium 1 if household socio-economic status lies in quantile 2-4, 0
otherwise
SES–High (quantile 5) 1 if household socio-economic status lies in quantile 5, 0
otherwise
Punjab 1 if household resides in Punjab, 0 otherwise
Sindh 1 if household resides in Sindh, 0 otherwise
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 1 if household resides in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 0
otherwise
Baluchistan 1 if household resides in Punjab, 0 otherwise
Urban 1 if household resides in Punjab, 0 otherwise
4
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents a detailed explanation of the variables used to test hy-
potheses generated by bargaining and feminist theory regarding married
women's empowerment over household R&T spending. These includemea-
sures of whether amarriedwomen is Employed, theNumber of (her) Children
residing in the household, if she lives in an Extended Family, and if so – the#
Adult Extended Family Members, and if herMother in Law is Present. Other in-
dependent variables described in Table 1 are the age and education level of
the wife and her husband alongwith indicators for – the socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES) of the household, province the household is located in, and if they
reside in an urban area of their province.
In Table 2 we report the level and distribution of married women's em-
powerment over household R&T expenditures for our analysis sample of
12,517 married women. Inspection of Table 2 reveals that 53% of married
women have no decision-making authority over their households' R&T ex-
penditures. For those empowered in this sphere it is typically Partial rather
than Strong – 38% and 9% respectively.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate
the determinants of married women's empowerment over household R&T
spending. In our analysis sample of married women 9% are employed for
pay outside of the family. Thirteen percent of married women are childless,
while amongst married women with children the average number of bio-
logical children living with them is 4. Only 13% of married women live
in a nuclear family, and the average extended family contains 9 adults
aside from the wife and her husband. Moreover, 18% of married women
who live in an extended family report that their mother in law lives with
them. The average age of the married woman and their husbands in our
analysis sample is 32 and 38 years of age respectively. Seventy-one percent
of the married women, and 38% of their husbands, never attended formal
school.
4. Methodology
The goal of our empiricalwork is to testHypotheses 1-4 regarding the de-
terminants of a married woman's empowerment over household spending
on R&T. The hypotheses were generated by household barging theory
that incorporates insights from feminist theory about the role of norms
and culture in shaping awoman's position in the household. The theoretical
framework led to the prediction that working for pay (Hypothesis 1), and the
number of her children (Hypothesis 2) – critical features of her life – are ex-
pected to foster greater empowerment. Because of their importance – and
the prospect that they may be influenced by her level of empowerment
resulting in reverse causality (which could cause estimates to be biased) –
we separate these variables from the other factors expected to influence
her level of empowerment, which are lumped into Xi in specifying the
model to be estimated,
Empowermenti ¼ λ Employedð Þi þ γ Number of Childrenið Þ þ β Xið Þ þ εi ð1Þ
where i refers to the married women respondent and εiis a normally distrib-
uted random error.6
The possibility of endogeneity bias when estimating the impact of em-
ployment, and in our view, the number of children as well, on female
spending autonomy, is well known (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Basu,
2006; Debnath, 2015; Hanmer and Klugman, 2016). This bias can arise
due to employment and having more children, being the outcome of a pro-
cess (Kabeer, 1999), and due to female empowerment influencing employ-
ment and having children (i.e., reverse causality). We refer to Eq. (1) as the
naïve model, since it ignores the prospect that working outside of the home6 A variable expected to influence amarriedwomen's level of R&T empowerment contained
in X is the gender of her children. To assess if boys provide a wife with greater expenditure em-
powerment than having girls we incorporate into our estimation of her empowerment a series
of five bivariate indicator variables regarding the gender of her children (see Table 1 for a de-
scription of thesemeasures).When this set of variables are all entered into the estimating equa-
tion simultaneously, the reference group is no biological children of the wife in the household.
Table 2
Level (percent) of married women's empowerment over recreation & travel spending.
Binary empowerment Gradational empowerment
No empowerment At least some empowerment No empowerment Partial empowerment Strong empowerment
Recreation & travel (%) 53 47 53 38 9
Number of observations (N= 12, 517) 6619 5898 6619 4791 1107
Data: Authors own calculations PSLM-2005-06.
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estimates of all the coefficients in Eq. (1). The conventional way to avert
such bias is by using the instrumental variables (IV) estimation method
(Greene, 2018, Chapter 8). IV estimation is a two-stage estimation process
that requires the identification and use of instruments – exogenous
variables – that only influence the dependent variable of interest
(i.e., empowerment) indirectly, through their effect on the endogenous var-
iables (i.e., employment and bearing additional children).
In the first stage – in our context – we separately estimate whether a
married woman is Employed, and the Number of (her) Children – using Fam-
ily Culture, for each of these, which are presumed to be different – as an in-
strumental variable.
Employedi ¼ ϕ FamilyCultureWorkingi
 
þ ψ Xið Þ þ ηi ð2aÞ
Number of Kidsi ¼ π FamilyCultureKidsi
 þ φ Xið Þ þ τi ð2bÞ
Next, we use the coefficient estimates from Eqs. (2a) and (2b) –
bϕ, bψ ,bπ, and bφ– to generate predictions for Employment and Number ofTable 3
Variable means - determinants of women's empowerment over recrea-
tional and travel spending.
Variable Analysis sample (mean)
Household structure
Employed 9%
Number of (her) Childrena 4
Nuclear Family 13%
# Adult Extended Family Members 9
Mother in Law Present 18%
Gender distribution of children
Only Boys 14%
Only Girls 12%
Boys > Girls 24%
Girls > Boys 20%




W-Some Education (1-8 years) 15%




H-Some Education (1-8 years) 29%
H-Well educated (above 8 years) 33%
Household socioeconomic status
SES–Low (quantile 1) 20%
SES–Medium (quantile 2-4) 59%







# of observations 12,517
a Authors own calculations from PSLM (2005-06).
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Children – P-Employment and P-Number of Children – respectively. Then, in
the second-stage, we estimate Eq. (3), the determinates of a married
woman's empowerment over spending on R&T using P-Employment and P-
Number of Children – which are exogenous since they are created using
only exogenous variables (i.e., Xi, FamilyCultureiWorking,
and FamilyCultureiKids) – rather than Employment and Number of Kids
which are endogenous, thereby eliminating the source of endogeneity bias,
Empowermenti ¼ λ P−Employedð Þi þ γ P−Number of Childrenið Þ þ β Xið Þ þ εi
ð3Þ
The bivariate model of women's empowerment – when the dependent
variable in Eq. (3) = 1 if a woman has At Least Some Empowerment or a
value of 0 when she has No Empowerment – is estimated using logit. The
alternative-specific multinomial logistic technique is used when estimating
Eq. (3) with a gradational measure of empowerment.
Whenwe report our IV estimates of Eq. (3) in Table 6 of the next section,
we present the estimated regression coefficients and their corresponding
marginal impacts. For a continuous independent variable, the marginal ef-
fect reveals the change in the probability of the outcome for a one-unit in-
crease in that independent variable, ceteris paribus (i.e., with all of the
other independent variables held at their mean). For binary independent
variables, themarginal impact is the difference in the probability of the out-
come when the independent variable takes on a value of 1 relative to a
value of 0, ceteris paribus.
4.1. Family culture as instruments - conceptually
Pakistani culture prescribes that when awoman ismarried, she joins her
husband's household, which typically includes his parents, and often, other
relatives of his as well. In these families, the family patriarch – the senior
male in the household – establishes the family's culture by designating
who has the authority to make decisions over various family activities.
This includes elements of life for adult females in the household such as op-
portunities for employment outside of the home, and goals regarding family
size. The family patriarch might grant himself sole responsibility, he could
designate someone else (i.e., such as his wife, the woman's husband), or a
combination of persons in the family – the authority to make these deci-
sions. Since these decisions, which reflect the families' culture are made
by the family patriarch – not by themarried women impacted – they are ex-
ogenous to her. We speculate that these forms of family culture directly af-
fect her likelihood ofworking and havingmore children, but do not directly
impact her level of empowerment over spending on R&T. Therefore, these
culture variables – conceptually – are good candidates to be our instru-
ments. We formally test the validity of this assumption and report the re-
sults in the results section.
4.2. Measuring family culture
The PSLM survey includes separate questions asking female respon-
dents who makes decisions over whether they should have more children
or work for pay. This is another attractive aspect of the PSLM, and no
other data set we are aware of contains such questions.Marriedwomen sur-
vey respondents reported, from a range of options running from no voice in
the matter to sole control. We use this information to construct a series of
bivariate indicators – set out in Table 4 – which together reflect an array
Table 4
Family culture types regarding married women's employment and having more children.
Panel A: Employment Panel B: Having more children
Family culture Number (%) Family culture Number (%)
Head/Father of the household decides alone 6795 (54) Husband alone 1956 (16)
Head/Father in consultation with his/her spouse 3094 (25) Woman herself 513 (4)
Head/Father in consultation with the woman concerned 281 (2) Husband & woman jointly 7807 (62)
Head/Father and spouse of the head in consultation with the woman concerned 234 (2) Mother of woman or husband 45 (0.36)
Head/Father and other male members decide 508 (4) Nobody 676 (5)
Other combinations of persons decide 94 (1) Other 23 (0.18)
Woman herself 1, 030 (8) It is in the hands of God 1496 (12)
Too old to work 85 (1)
Woman concerned has no interest in work 396 (3)
Notes: “woman concerned is too old to work” and “woman concerned has no interest in work” are excluded from the empirical analysis. .
Table 5
Summary table, estimates of family culture on employment, and having more
children.




Panel A: Dependent variable -employment
Head/Father-in-law of the household decides alone −1.642*** −0.186 0.14
Head/Father in law in consultation with his/her
spouse
−0.861*** −0.120 0.14
Head/Father in law consultation with the woman
concerned
−1.274*** −0.159 0.29
Head/Father in law and spouse of the head/Father in
law in consultation
−1.017*** −0.135 0.37
Head/Father and other male members decide −2.052*** −0.207 0.44
Other combination of persons decide −0.719** −0.111 0.38
Too old to work −1.817*** −0.196 0.66
Woman concerned has no interest in work −2.325*** −0.217 0.37
Strength of the Instruments: F-Test: Null, all of the
instruments – family culture variables = 0
F(8,12,509) = 27.88; Prob > F
= 0.0000
Panel B: Dependent variable -number of children
Husband Alone −0.55* −0.190 0.031
Husband and woman jointly −0.55** −0.190 0.028
Mother of woman or husband −0.077 −0.262 0.103
Nobody −0.109*** −0.366 0.037
Other 0.103 0.384 0.114
In the hands of God −0.094*** −0.316 0.031
Strength of the Instruments: F-Test: Null, all of the
instruments – family culture variables = 0
F(6,12,511) = 8.35; Prob > F
= 0.000
Notes: ***, **, * respectively are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. The reference
group for family culture is married women alone make the decision.
7 An F-test with the null that all of the instruments together have no impact on the probabil-
ity of employment – a standard means of evaluating the validity of the set of instruments – is
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Moreover, the F-statistic for the entire equation
(i.e., null hypothesis that all of the coefficient estimates =0) is 28, which is significant at the
1% level of significance and surpasses the required critical value of 2.51 to be a strong
instrument.
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ing outside of the home for pay (Panel A), and having additional children
(Panel B).
For our analysis sample of 12,517married women, 54% live in a house-
hold where the family patriarch alone makes the decision, without hearing
thoughts of any other household member, concerning whether she can
work outside of the home. Moreover, another 25% of married women re-
side in a household where the family patriarch and his spouse (i.e., the
wife's mother in law) together – without consulting other household mem-
bers – make decisions about married female employment. In only 4% of
households does the family patriarch or the patriarch and his spouse con-
sult with themarriedwoman concerned in establishing the family's orienta-
tion toward married female household members working outside of the
home for pay. Finally, in 8% of families, the family culture is to provide
the woman concerned with a sense that she, alone, can decide on whether
to work outside the home for pay.
In our analysis sample 62% of families have a culture in which the hus-
band of the woman and the woman jointly make decisions over having ad-
ditional children. While 16% of households are ones where the husband
alone is perceived to make this decision. Married women in another 12%
of families reported that God is responsible for whether they have more
children. Five percent of married women report that “nobody” influences
her decision about bearing additional children. We interpret this to mean
that in these households the underlying presumption is that married
women are aware of the expectation for them, from the family patriarch,
to have more children.
4.3. Assessing our IV estimation strategy
To be confident that the instrumental variables estimation procedure
we adopt is suitable to generate unbiased estimates of the determinants of
women's empowerment over household R&T spending we must document
the validity of three key conditions (C1-C3), each of which is testable. First,
we assert (C1) that a family's culture regarding the employment of married
women in the household is different from its culture toward additional
childbearing by married women in the family. Second (C2), that each of
the instrumental variables we use – themeasure of family culture regarding
employment and havingmore children – are good predictors of working for
pay and having additional children respectively. Third (C3), that the instru-
mental variables – measures of family culture – only indirectly effect
women's empowerment over R&T expenditures through their effects on
employment and having additional offspring.
We calculated the strength of the correlations between the binary indi-
cators for alternative family cultures regarding female employment and
married women having more children to assess this assumption. We find
that 92% of these correlations are ≤0.1 and the other 8% are, >0.1
and ≤0.3 – evidence consistent with C1 (this table is available upon
request).
Our estimates of Eqs. (2a) and (2b) provide the information needed to
assess C2. These equations are estimated using Probit and Poisson regres-
sions respectively since Employed is a bivariate measure (Employed = 1 if6
the wife works for pay outside the home, 0 otherwise) and the Number of
Children is an ordered variable that ranges from 0 (no children) to 14 (the
maximum number).
Table 5 is a summary table that presents our estimates for employment
and the number of married woman's children in the household. The results
for the other determinants, the same set of controls that are used in the es-
timation of women's empowerment over R&T spending, are available upon
request. Probit estimates of the effect of the six binary indicators used to
capture alternative types of family culture toward female paid employment
are presented in Panel A. The reference group is a family culture in which
married women report that they alone can make this decision.
All six of the family culture toward female employment indicators are
negatively related to the likelihood ofworking andhighly significant (statis-
tically). These findings are consistent with C2 and suggest that households
that are most friendly to married women working outside of the home for
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solely, the license to make this decision – the reference category.7
Poisson estimates of the six binary indicators used to reflect various
forms of family culture towards married women in the home having an-
other child are presented in Table 5 Panel B. The family culture reference
category is one where the Woman Herself senses that she has the authority
to make this decision. Five of the six family cultures towards additional
childbearing are negatively related to the likelihood of her having more
children – and 4 of these are statistically significant.8 The findings reported
in Table 5 are clearly consistent with C2.
C3 asserts that out measures of family culture do not directly affect a
married women's level of spending authority over a household's R&T ex-
penditures; their influence on female R&T expenditure empowerment is in-
direct – operating solely through their impact on paid employment and
additional childbearing. We report the Sargan test in the notes to Table 6
– which is the standard means of evaluating the efficacy of this assertion.
This test reveals that the measures of family culture towards work and fer-
tility do not directly influence women's R&T spending agency (i.e., our
overidentifying restrictions are valid). This means that we can plausibly de-
scribe our IV estimates – presented in the next section – as causal determi-
nants of married women's empowerment over R&T spending – not merely
association due to the possibility that the estimates suffer from bias due
to reverse causality.
5. Results
Table 6 is a summary table that presents our binary and gradational IV
estimates of Eq. (3) – the determinates of married women's empowerment
over household spending on R&T. These estimates provide tests of Hypoth-
eses 1-4 regarding how R&T spending empowerment for married women is
effected, respectively, by: predicted employment, predicted number of bio-
logical children in the household, household structure characteristics, and
the married women's level of education. Full results are available upon re-
quest.
Hypothesis 1: Employment and empowermentEmployment (i.e., P-Employment) significantly increases the probability
of married women having At Least Some Empowerment over R&T expendi-
ture, by 26.6%, relative to married women who are not working (Table 6
- first row, column 3). Our gradational findings also presented in the first
row of Table 6, indicate that compared to married women who are not
working for pay, those who are employed, are significantly more likely to
have Partial Empowerment relative to No Empowerment– by 17.7%. These
findings support Hypothesis 1, which contends that married women who
work for pay are able to secure greater authority over household spending
on R&T. Moreover, our findings reveal that married women who are
employed are 8.4% more likely to have Strong Empowerment than Partial
Empowerment, and this effect is also significant. Thus, we learn from the gra-
dational estimator that the distribution of the gain in R&T expenditure em-
powerment for married women – fostered by employment – is across the
empowerment spectrum and is not merely located at a low level.
When employment is treated as exogenous – Table 7 – which we argue
is problematic, the estimates suggest that married women who are
employed are just as likely as married women who do not work for pay to
have:At Least Some Empowerment, Partial Empowerment asNo Empowerment,
and Strong Empowerment as Partial Empowerment. This is at odds with our
findings, presented above when employment is treated as endogenous.
This confirms the importance of our IV estimation procedure to address
the problem of endogeneity (i.e., causing the estimates to be biased).
Hypothesis 2: Children and empowerment8
prob
theThe F-test of the null hypothesis that all of the instruments together have no impact on the
ability of her having more children is rejected at the 1% level of significance. In addition,
F-statistic for Equation 2b is 230, signifying these are strong instruments.
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Our findings for the impact of Predicted Number of Children on married
female empowerment over R&T expenditures are presented in the second
row of Table 6. Having another child significantly increases the likelihood
of having At Least Some Empowerment relative to No Empowerment – by
10.6% and – Partial Empowerment compared to No Empowerment by 7.2%
(Table 6, row 2). This evidence supports Hypothesis 2a which asserts that
having another child provides married women with greater leverage in
bargaining with their husbands over household spending authority over
R&T.Moreover, there is no significant difference in the likelihood of having
Strong Empowerment compared to Partial Empowerment. The pattern of find-
ings is the samewhether the number of children a married woman has who
are living in her household is treated as endogenous or exogenous. How-
ever, the size of the estimated effect is substantially larger when
endogeneity is accounted for (see Table 7).
We also find that the positive impact of having more children on –
having At Least Some Empowerment, and on Partial Empowerment relative
to No Empowerment – declines with each additional child (i.e., the esti-
mated coefficient on P-Number of Children Squared is negative and sta-
tistically significant). This finding is in line with Hypothesis 2b which
posits that the impact of having additional children on women's em-
powerment over household R&T expenditures is subject to diminishing
returns.
For the binary and gradational agency models, we find virtually no ev-
idence that the gender composition of amothers' children influences her de-
gree of empowerment over household R&T spending. This is a striking set
of findings which is at odds Hypothesis 2c – the notion that Pakistani
women are rewardedwith greater expenditure authority over family spend-
ing on R&T for having boys, especially lots of them.
Hypothesis 3: Family structure and empowermentMarried women living in an Extended Family are significantly less likely
to have At Least Some R&T spending empowerment relative to married
women residing in a nuclear household – by 17.9%. Besides, they are less
likely to have Partial Empowerment compared to No Empowerment by
14.6% and just as likely to have Partial Empowerment as Strong Empower-
ment. This evidence supportsHypothesis 3a that living in an extended family
undermines a married woman's leverage in bargaining with her husband
over R&T spending agency.
Moreover, we find that married females living in an Extended Family –
relative to comparable married women residing in such a family but with
one additional adult extended family member – are just as likely to have
At Least Some Empowerment in the realm of R&T spending as No Empower-
ment. However, our findings from the gradational model reveal that an ad-
ditional adult extended family member significantly reduces the likelihood
a married woman will have Partial Empowerment relative to No Empower-
ment– although the magnitude of this effect is small – 1.4% – and they are
just as likely to have Strong Empowerment as Partial Empowerment. These
findings – which are consistent with Hypothesis 3b – reveal the deeper in-
sights into female R&T spending empowerment garnered by the grada-
tional framework, relative to the conventional binary approach to
gauging expenditure empowerment. In summary, as hypothesized, living
with more adult extended family members undermines married women's
R&T spending authority – but this is not a relatively large contributor to
women's spending empowerment in this sphere.
Married females living in an extended family, but with their mother in
law in the household (i.e., Mother in Law Present) – relative to comparable
married women who do not reside with their mother in law – are signifi-
cantly less likely to have At Least Some Empowerment. Moreover, the grada-
tional estimates also reveal that when amother in law resides in the home a
married woman is significantly less likely to have Partial Empowerment rel-
ative toNoEmpowerment by 46.5%. This evidence is consistentwithHypoth-
esis 3c which posits that living with her mother in law reduces a married
woman's authority over R&T spending.
Hypothesis 4: Education and empowerment
Table 6
Summary table – effect of variables associated with key hypotheses on married women's empowerment over recreation & travel spending.
Binary approach Gradational approach
At least some empowerment vs no
empowerment
Partial empowerment vs no empowerment Strong empowerment vs partial empowerment
Coefficient Marginal effect Std err. Coefficient Marginal effect Std err. Coefficient Marginal effect Std err.
P-Employment 1.244*** 0.266 0.133 1.129*** 0.177 0.135 0.586*** 0.084 0.146
P-Number of Children 0.498*** 0.106 0.142 0.460** 0.072 0.146 0.240 0.034 0.229
P-Number of Children (squared) −0.042*** −0.009 0.014 −0.038** −0.006 0.015 −0.023 −0.003 0.022
Extended Family −0.841*** −0.179 0.151 −0.832*** −0.146 0.156 −0.067 −0.034 0.273
# Adult Extended Family Members −0.017 −0.004 0.014 −0.024* −0.006 0.014 0.037 0.002 0.025
Mother in Law Present −1.649*** −0.352 0.392 −2.127*** −0.465 0.500 1.955** 0.078 0.834
W-Some Education (up to 8 years) 0.607*** 0.128 0.090 0.548*** 0.079 0.091 0.364** 0.048 0.149
W-Well-educated (above 8 years) 0.029 0.006 0.121 −0.060 −0.033 0.121 0.546** 0.041 0.202
Notes: Reference categories for the binary indicator variables are: not employed, nuclear family, mother in law not residing in the family. ***, **, * respectively are significant
at 1%, 5% and 10%. Sargan Test (based on alternative estimations of an instrumental variable regression (2sls): Chi-sq(2) P-value = 0.241).
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to make decisions over household spending on R&T –Hypothesis 4. We find
that married women who completed Some Education – relative to women
with no formal schooling –were significantlymore likely to have: Some Em-
powerment, and Partial Empowerment, compared to No Empowerment. This
evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 4.6. Conclusion
Recreation and travel tour operators in general (Kotler, Bowen,Makens,
& Baloglu, 2017), and in Pakistan (Haq et al., 2008), learn and respond to
the preferences of their clients in developing itineraries. Moreover, Eid
and El-Gohary (2014) assert that Muslim tourism operators recognize that
men and women do not seek identical things out of R&T experiences. For
instance, women are more interested in having shopping opportunities
while chances to attend sporting events are more attractive to men. Unfor-
tunately, heretofore, little is known about the extent to which married
women in Pakistan are empowered to make such spending decisions, and
what factors provide them with R&T spending agency – which makes it
challenging for tourism operators in Pakistan to plan effectively. We ad-
dress this shortcoming in the literature using data drawn from the PSLM:
2005-2006.
About half of the married women in our analysis sample of married
women in Pakistan, which is representative of the population, have At
Least Some decision-making empowerment over their families spending
on R&T, and 10% of them have Strong Empowerment. Our estimates reveal
that employment for pay outside of the home – accounting for the
endogeneity of work and having another child – is a powerful determinant
of married women's empowerment over R&T expenditures. In addition,
having additional children significantly advances the empowerment of
married women over household R&T spending.Table 7
Effect of employment and number of children – treated as exogenous (naïve model) – o
Binary approach Gradation
At least some empowerment vs partial
empowerment
Partial em
Coefficient Marginal effect Standard error Coefficien
Employment 0.342 0.083 0.238 0.113
Number of children 0.277*** 0.067 0.030 0.210***
Number of children (Squared) −0.021*** −0.004 0.003 −0.014*
# of observations (12,517).
Notes: ***, **, * respectively are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
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Our findings (first-stage estimates) reveal that for married women em-
ployment for pay outside of the home and having additional children are
largely driven by family culture. Thus, the culture of the family a woman
marries into will play a critical role in governing her ability to make deci-
sions over R&T spending.
Our empirical work also reveals that married women acquire less R&T
spending empowerment when they are poorly educated, live in; rural
areas, and in extended families – especially large ones, and with a
mother-in-law present. Furthermore, the estimates we present suggest
that the gender composition of a mother's offspring is unrelated to their
level of R& empowerment – a surprising finding.
The resultswe report can guide tourismoperators in facilitating R&T ac-
tivities in Pakistan. Recall, that in our analysis sample, only 9% of married
women in Pakistan are employed. Moreover, 7 out of 10married women in
Pakistan have completed no years of formal education. Thus, the prospect
of advances in married female empowerment over R&T spending in
Pakistan, arising through education and employment is possible, especially
since the percent of females employed has been rising over the past two de-
cades. Tourism operators, by tracking these developments can anticipate
when and how to alter the itineraries of the packages they offer.
There are a number of data-based limitations to keep in mind when
reflecting on our findings. The PSLM survey collects information from fe-
male respondents on who in the household decides whether she can work
for pay or should seek to have another child. Similarly, women report
their level of empowerment over household spending on R&T. These mea-
sures may suffer from measurement error if women overstate, or under-
state, their level of empowerment. However, since they provide these
answers privately to the PSLM survey enumerator we do not expect system-
atic mismeasurement. Moreover, Kabeer (1999) claims that when women
answer survey questions in private, even in patriarchal societies, they
offer accurate reports of their perceptions.n married women's empowerment over recreation & travel spending.
al approach
powerment vs no empowerment Strong empowerment vs partial empowerment
t Marginal effect Standard error Coefficient Marginal effect Standard error
0.037 0.141 0.075 0.047 0.153
0.041 0.061 −0.080 0.026 0.130
** −0.003 0.006 0.003 −0.002 0.011
S.U. Khan et al. Annals of Tourism Research Empirical Insights 2 (2021) 100009Another concern is that we are unable to separately investigate the de-
terminants of female empowerment over domestic and international spend-
ing on R&T, because of how the data are collected.
The data we use come from 2005 to 2006 and it is possible that the im-
portance of children and earning towomen's empowerment has changed or
that the family cultures that influence these features of women's lives have
evolved. Although there have been several rounds of the PSLM after 2005-
06, the subsequent routines lack information on women's decision making
authority over R&T expenditures at the household level. Fortunately, there
is evidence (Bhatti and Jeffery, 2012) that cultural norms towards women
evolve slowly in Pakistan, a trend documented by Seguino (2007) for
over 70 countries using data from the World Values Survey.
Finally, the data do not permit us to evaluate if household spending on
R&T is greater when women can make these decisions rather than men.
This is a topic for future research.
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